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A. Nature of the Case. 
In this appeal, the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney appeals the District Court's decision 
in ruling that Defendant Property Nine Thousand Four Hundred Fifteen and 64/100 Dollars 
($9,415.64) United States Currency is not subject to forfeiture under the Idaho Controlled 
Substances Act. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
This case arises from Claimant William Scott DeMint's August 20, 2014 arrest, which 
resulted in a guilty plea and conviction for trafficking methamphetamine and which gave rise to 
the instant civil forfeiture. Plaintiff filed this action on September 8, 2014 and Mr. DeMint 
answered on November 14, 2014. On July 6, 2015, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment with supporting memorandum and affidavits. On December 3, 2015, the district court 
heard Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, and on December 8, 2015, the court issued a 
ruling denying summary judgment as to Defendant Property Nine Thousand Four Hundred 
Fifteen and 64/100 Dollars ($9,415.64) United States Currency and granting summary judgment 
as to all remaining Defendant Property. 1 A court trial was held before Judge Duff McKee on 
1 Summary judgment was granted as to the following items of Defendant Property: 1998 Ford 
F150, VIN 1FTRX18L9WKB27754; Twelve Thousand Seven Hundred Ninety-Four and 
00/100 Dollars ($12,794.00) United States Currency; Approximately Four Hundred Forty-One 
and Forty-Seven Hundredths (441.47) Grams Methamphetamine; Approximately Twelve and 
Seventy-Nine Hundredths (12.79) Grams Marijuana; Ten (10) 16-MG Pills Hydromorphone; 
One (1) Taurus Millennium 9-MM Handgun, Model PTI 11, Serial No. TSC27053, with One 
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9, 16. s 
DeMint' s motion for verdict. Plaintiff now 
C. Statement of Facts. 
On August 20, 2014, Deputy Lowry with the Ada County Sheriff's Office ("ACSO") 
stopped a vehicle driven by Claimant William Scott DeMint2 for speeding and failure to signal a 
lane change for five seconds. Tr. p. 24, LL. 21-25, p. 25, LL. 1-13 at the time of the stop, Mr. 
DeMint had been travelling in a drug corridor, a route commonly used by traffickers to transport 
controlled substances. Tr. p. 48, LL. 7-13, p. 49, LL. 3-8. Following a K-9 alert on the vehicle, 
officers located, among other items, Defendant Property Twelve Thousand Seven Hundred 
Ninety-Four Dollars ($12,794.00) United States Currency, a handgun, 441.47 grams of 
methamphetamine, 12.79 grams of marijuana, ten 16-milligram pills of hydromorphone, five 
digital scales, ten glass bongs, and thirty-one glass pipes. Tr. p. 25, LL. 14-19, p. 26, LL. 1-8, Ex. 
1, Cr. p. 104-08. Mr. DeMint was arrested and transported to the Ada County Jail on a charge for 
trafficking methamphetamine. Tr. p. 25, LL. 18-25, p. 26, LL. 1-8, p. 30, LL. 13-15, Ex. 1. Later 
that day, Detectives James Roberson and Javier Bustos with the ACSO interviewed Mr. DeMint 
(1) Magazine of Ten (10) Rounds 9-MM Ammunition; Two (2) Folding Knives; One (1) 
Vipertek Taser; One (1) Digital Scale With Residue and Black Case; Four ( 4) Digital Scales in 
Boxes; One (1) Green Metal Container; One (1) Orange Mesh Bag; One (1) Red Mesh Bag; 
One (1) Black Mesh Bag; One (1) Blue Chase Bank Bag; Various Plastic Ziploc Bags; Two 
(P2) Glass Pipes With Burnt Residue; One (1) Small Metal Smoking Pipe With Burnt Residue; 
Ten (10) Glass Bongs; and Thirty-One (31) Glass Pipes. 
2 When Mr. DeMint was stopped by Deputy Lowry, he was accompanied by passenger Joshua 
Allen Thomas. The District Court entered an Order Allowing Default and a Default Judgment 
as to Mr. Thomas in this matter on January 16, 2015 as to all Defendant Property. 
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detectives that he was unemployed and looking for work. p. 13-25, 35, 1-5. 
Mr. DeMint's phone calls were monitored by Detective Roberson during his time at the 
Ada County Jail. Tr. p. 37, LL. 8-13. A transcript of several of Mr. DeMint's jail phone calls 
were admitted into evidence at trial. On August 20, 2014, Mr. DeMint called a woman and 
requested that she transfer $10,000 out of his bank account immediately. Ex. 3, p. 40, LL. 16-25, 
p. 43, LL. 17-18. He provided her his Chase bank account information in order to extract the 
money, and expressed fear that the money was going to be taken. Ex. 3, p. 41, LL. 1-25, p. 42, 
LL. 1-4, p. 43, LL. 14-21. 
Mr. DeMint then called a man and gave instructions on what to do with his bank account. 
Ex 3, p. 16, LL. 6-11. He said that half of the money should be put on his "books" and the other 
half given to "Linda." Id. Mr. DeMint explained that he needed the money removed from his 
account and told the man, "Just get it out of the bank for now [ ... ] We'll worry about where it 
goes. [ ... ] [T]ransfer them into someone else's bank account. .. or they're going to confiscate 
it[.]" Ex. 3, p. 18, LL. 1-8. 
Upon reviewing the above phone calls, Detective Roberson wrote a seizure affidavit in 
order to seize the money from Mr. DeMint's bank account. Tr. p. 40, LL. 11 p. 41, LL. 1-11. 
A seizure warrant was issued and served upon Chase Bank. Tr. p. 41, LL. 9-22. On or about 
14, 





Mr. De Mint's bank records from the relevant dates were admitted into evidence at trial. 
Mr. DeMint's bank statement for the month of June shows out-of-state purchases in Utah and 
Colorado on July 7, 2014. Ex. 4, p. 80-81. Mr. DeMint's bank statement beginning July 8, 2014 
shows a beginning balance of -$161.04. Ex. 4, p. 83. On July 16, the statement shows a deposit 
in the amount of $26,268.19. Id. After that large deposit, a number of cash withdrawals occurred, 
including a withdrawal of $4,000 on July 17, a withdrawal of $5,000.00 on July 21, and a 
withdrawal of $4,500.00 on July 30. Ex. 4, pp. 83-84. Additionally, the July statement shows 
out-of-state purchases in Winnemucca, Nevada and Yuba City, California from July 21 through 
July 22, 2014 and from July 30 to August 1, 2014. Ex. 4, pp. 84-85. Many of these expenses 
were incurred for gas and hotels. Id. 
Mr. DeMint's beginning balance for the month of August, 2014 was $3,709.59. Ex. 4, p. 
94. A number of large cash deposits occurred, including a deposit of $4,650.00 on August 13 and 
two deposits equaling $6,450.00 on August 18. Ex. 4, p. 95. Both deposits occurred after Mr. 
DeMint traveled to Yuba City, California and Winnemucca, Nevada his bank records show 
purchases in these places August 7 through August 11, 2014 and August 13 through August 14, 
2014. Ex. 4, pp. 94-95. Again, many of Mr. Demint's out-of-state purchases were incurred for 
gas and hotels. Ex. 4, pp. 94-95. Additionally, the August statement shows that Mr. DeMint 
3 Thousand Four Hundred Fifteen 
in this 
on same 
Mr. DeMint ultimately pled guilty to trafficking methamphetamine and was sentenced on 
May 27, 2015. Plaintiff initiated the instant lawsuit on September 8, 2014. Mr. DeMint is the 
only claimant remaining in this matter,4 and Defendant Property Nine Thousand Four Hundred 
Fifteen and 64/100 Dollars ($9,415.64) United States Currency from Mr. DeMint's bank account 
is the only Defendant Property still at issue. 5 Because the district court granted Mr. DeMint's 
motion for directed verdict, the record includes only Plaintiffs case-in-chief. 
IL 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
(1) Whether the District Court erred in entering a directed verdict in Mr. DeMint's favor, 
and (2) Whether the District Court erred in ruling that Defendant Property Nine Thousand Four 
Hundred Fifteen and 64/100 Dollars ($9,415.64) United States Currency is not subject to 
forfeiture per Idaho Code Section 37-2744 and the Idaho Uniform Controlled Substances Act, 
Idaho Code§§ 37-2701, et seq. 
STANDARD 
As aforementioned, Mr. DeMint prevailed upon a motion for directed verdict In 
reviewing the entry of a directed verdict, the appellate court must apply the same standard that 
4 The only other claimant, Joshua Allen Thomas, was defaulted on January 16, 2015. 
5 The District Court awarded Plaintiff summary judgment and forfeiture of all other items of 
Defendant Property in an order dated December 8, 2015. 
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court 1 
11 11 (1986). a should IS a 
and on those questions, the parties are entitled to full review by the appellate court without 
special deference to the views of the trial court." Id. The Supreme Court of Idaho has therefore 
ruled that in determining whether a motion for directed verdict should have been granted, the 
appellate court "must determine whether, admitting the truth of the adverse evidence and 
drawing every legitimate inference most favorably to the opposing party, there exists substantial 
evidence to justify submitting the case to the jury." Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 
495, 508-09, 95 P.3d 977, 990-91 (2004) ( citation omitted). The requirement of substantial 
evidence "does not require the evidence to be uncontradicted. It requires only that the evidence 
be of sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could conclude that a verdict 
in favor of the party against whom the motion is made is proper." Id. at 509, 991 (citation 
omitted). 
However, because the case at hand involved a court trial rather than a trial by jury, the 
proper motion before the District Court was one for involuntary dismissal under Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 41 (b) and not a motion for directed verdict. See Durrant v. Quality Fist Mktg., 
127 Idaho 558, 559, 903 P.2d 147, 148 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995), Spirit Ridge Mineral Springs, 
LLC v. Franklin County, 157 Idaho 424,426, 337 P.3d 583, 585 (2014). I.R.C.P. 41(b) provides, 
in pertinent part: 
After the plaintiff, in an action tried by court without a jury, has completed the 




judgment against the plaintiff or may "'~•vu,,v 
close of all the evidence. 
In assessing an involuntary dismissal, an appellate court "review[ s] freely any statements 
of law and the court's conclusion that the facts as found did not entitle [plaintiff] to relief. "6 




The district court misapplied the preponderance standard in this case; a proper application 
of the standard shows that the $9,415.64 is subject to forfeiture under the Idaho Controlled 
Substances Act. 
A. The District Court Failed to Apply the Correct Standard. 
In making its determination in this matter, the district court applied the incorrect standard 
to Plaintiff's case. Idaho Code Section 37-2744 subjects to forfeiture all property "which has 
been used or intended for use in connection with the illegal manufacture, distribution, dispensing 
or possession" of controlled substances. The Section further provides that forfeiture proceedings 
are in rem civil actions and that the standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence. 
I.C. § 37-2744. To meet a preponderance burden, the evidence must show that something is 
6 When an appellate court reviews a district court's findings of fact, it may overturn such 
findings of fact only if they are "clearly erroneous." Idaho Power Co. v. Co generation, Inc., 
134 Idaho 738, 743, 9 P.3d 1204, 1209 (2000). However, here, the district court made no 
findings of fact; thus, Plaintiff herein challenges the district court's application of law. 
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1082 (2003 ). ma case, a must 
was, more likely than not, used or intended for use in connection with illegal drug activity. 
In this matter, the district court stated that it applied a preponderance of the evidence 
standard. Tr. p. 100, LL. 18-25, p. 101, LL. 1-3. However, a review of the court's oral ruling 
exposes a flawed application of the standard. The court began its ruling by stating that an attempt 
to forfeit money from a bank account "build[s] a mountain ... that is almost insurmountable." Tr. 
p. 95, LL. 24-25, p. 96, LL. 1-3. This statement alone conflicts with the preponderance standard; 
it more accurately describes "beyond a reasonable doubt," a much higher burden. The Supreme 
Court of Idaho has likened "beyond a reasonable doubt" to "the summit of a high mountain." 
v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 63 (1927). The district court's extension of such a definition to the 
preponderance standard is erroneous. Following the above, the court states two propositions 
which are troubling when compared with the preponderance standard. 
First, t~e district court held that the Plaintiff was required to trace the funds in the bank 
account and stated, "[Y]ou have to be very precise; a dollar in, you get a dollar out." Tr. p. 97, 
LL. 19-22. Second, and even more troublesome, the district court ruled that in order to meet its 
burden, the Plaintiff was required to disprove all Mr. DeMint's potential legitimate sources of 
income, despite the absence of any such sources on the record. Specifically, the court stated, 
"You have to rule out all. .. other possibilities of where the money might have gone." Tr. p. 100, 
1 . These two propositions display that court erred in applying a burden much higher 
no or 
order to forfeit funds a bank account-the law merely requires that a that 
money was more likely than not used in connection with illegal drug activity. Idaho courts have 
never addressed the subject and have therefore never required plaintiffs to trace money in a bank 
account. 
Where the Idaho Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on a matter involved in a civil 
forfeiture, the Court has stated: "the Idaho legislature included a 'uniformity of interpretation' 
provision, which directs that the Idaho act shall be applied and construed to make uniform the 
law with respect to the subject of the act among those states that enact it." State v. Barraza-
Martinez, 139 Idaho 624, 626, 84 P.3d 560, 562 (2003). Thus, other states' interpretations of 
forfeiture statutes similar to Idaho's may be directive here. 
Though Idaho law has not addressed tracing money, various other courts which have 
ruled that the plaintiff does not have to link monies from a bank account to any one particular 
transaction. See United States v. $1,101.00 in United States Currency, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
94349, at *8 (W.D. Wash. 2015) ("The government may discharge its burden with circumstantial 
evidence, and it is not required to trace assets to particular transactions." (citations omitted)), 
Commonwealth v. 32,950.00 United States Currency, 160 Pa. Commw. 58 (1993) (ruling that 
requiring the government to "produce evidence directly linking the property to the illegal 
activity" was "too strict and would impose an onerous burden" on the government) ( citation 
United States v. $49, in United States Currency, 763 F.Supp.2d 1160 (N.D. Cal. 
10) met 1S on 
V. s., 
15 1 Ala. 1 (ruling that the not required to 
off er direct evidence of a connection between the defendant currency and a specific drug 
transaction."). Other courts have ruled that while tracing is required, it involves a totality of the 
circumstances approach, rather than the dollar in, dollar out approach as suggested by the district 
court in this case. See United States v. 174,206.00 in United States Currency, 320 F.3d 658 (6th 
Cir. 2003) (ruling that forfeiture was proper where claimants' legitimate income did not support 
the large amount of money found in claimants' safe deposit boxes), United States v. Funds in the 
Amount of Thirty Thousand Six Hundred Seventy Dollars ($30,670.00), 403 F.3d 448 (7th Cir. 
2005). The 7th Circuit Comi of Appeals also noted that "[i]n evaluating the evidence of proceeds 
traceable to drug transactions, we ... eschew[] clinical detachment and endorse[] a common 
sense view to the realities of normal life applied to the totality of the circumstances." Id. at 469 
(citation omitted). In one case, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals noted that a lack of documents 
directly tracing money "is not how legitimate business transactions are handled. It is, however, 
the way drug rings operate." United States v. Carrell, 252 F.3d 1193, 1201 (11th Cir. 2001). 
Here, the lack of account tracing is, of its own accord, indicative of its use in illegal drug 
transactions. Despite being unemployed, during the two months preceding his arrest, Mr. DeMint 
deposited over $37,000.00 into his bank account. Mr. DeMint had no legitimate source of 
income and there was no evidence before the district court suggesting that the money came from 
a legitimate source. The only evidence on the record shows that Mr. DeMint is a 
was, 
corridor, a route commonly used by drug traffickers. The record also shows that at 
a drug 
time of his 
arrest, Mr. DeMint was in possession of a large amount of methamphetamine, marijuana, cash, 
five digital scales, a gun, ten glass bongs, and thirty-one glass pipes. All of this evidence 
suggests that Mr. DeMint was involved in a drug operation. Thus, an inability to directly trace 
the funds makes sense; as the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals noted, it is "the way drug rings 
operate." Id. On this error alone, the case is subject to remand. 
The district court also applied the incorrect standard when it required Plaintiff to disprove 
every potential legitimate source of income. No Idaho statutory or case law requires Plaintiff to 
disprove potential sources of income. In fact, no court has interpreted the preponderance 
stancb, d so strictly against a plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Michigan stated, "In deciding 
whether there is sufficient evidence to support a ruling of drug forfeiture, courts look to the 
totality of the circumstances and do not try to pick them off, one by one, by conjuring up some 
alternative hypothesis of innocence ... " People v. $180,975 in United States Currency (In re 
Forfeiture of $180,975), 478 Mich. 444,471, 734 N.W.2d 489, 504 (2007). 
Here, the district court did just that. No evidence on the record supports that the money in 
Mr. DeMint's bank account is from a legitimate source; however, the court hypothesized: "I have 
no idea whether [Mr. De Mint] is a gambler or. .. whether he has a rich uncle that loaded him up 
with this money ... I don't know where this money goes. But it could be all sorts of places." Tr. 
99, LL. 17-21. The court went on, noting that Plaintiff has "to rule out all of these other 
of where the money might " p. 1 1 . 
was was, more or 
use in connection with illegal drug activity. A requirement for Plaintiff to disprove all 
potential legitimate sources of income created a burden far beyond preponderance in favor of one 
that is, in the district court's words, "almost insurmountable." 
The district court erred in requiring Plaintiff to directly trace money into and out of Mr. 
DeMint's bank account and to disprove all potential legitimate sources of income. Because the 
court applied the incorrect standard, the matter is subject to remand for application of the correct 
legal standard. 
B. The District Court Erred in Ruling that Defendant Property Nine Thousand 
Four Hundred Fifteen and 64/100 Dollars ($9,415.64) United States Currency 
is Not Subject to Forfeiture. 
Applying the preponderance standard properly, the evidence on the record shows that the 
Defendant Property involved in this appeal was more likely than not used or intended for use in 
Mr. DeMint's trafficking of methamphetamine and is therefore subject to forfeiture. As 
previously stated, courts have ruled that "in evaluating the evidence of proceeds traceable to drug 
transactions, we have eschewed clinical detachment and endorsed a common sense view to the 
realities of normal life applied to the totality of the circumstances." Funds in the Amount of 
Thirty Thousand Six Hundred Seventy Dollars ($30,670.00), 403 F.3d at 469 (citation omitted), 
see also $180,975 in United States Currency, 478 Mich. at 471, 734 N.W.2d at 504, 
Commonwealth v. $6,425.00 Seized/ram Esquilin, 583 Pa. 544,880 A.2d 523 (2005). 
IS courts on as: the 
significance the claimant's travel route at the time of arrest,7 the frequency claimant's trips 
to a drug source location, and the claimant's lack of legitimate income to support his available 
funds. See Funds in the Amount of Thirty Thousand Six Hundred Seventy Dollars ($30,670.00), 
403 F.3d 448, 174,206.00 in United States Currency, 320 F.3d 658. Plaintiff placed such 
evidence on the record, but the district court failed to consider it under the appropriate standard. 
Giving due consideration to such evidence, Defendant Property is subject to forfeiture because 
the totality of the circumstances shows that it was derived from Mr. DeMint's sales of 
methamphetamine and because it was used to support his frequent travel to purchase and sell 
methamphetamine, as further detailed below. 
To begin with, Mr. DeMint received Defendant Property from selling metharnphetamine. 
The evidence at hand shows that his sole source of income was distributing methamphetamine. 
He possessed almost a pound of methamphetamine, 8 five digital scales, almost forty smoking 
devices, and $12,794.00 cash at the time of his arrest and ultimately pled guilty to trafficking 
methamphetamine.9 Additionally, ACSO detectives had received information that Mr. DeMint 
7 Various state and federal courts have held a defendant's travel route through a known drug 
corridor is probative in forfeiture cases, despite the fact that the route may be a common travel 
route. See People v. $180,975 in United States Currency, 478 Mich. 444, 466-468 (2007). 
8 Mr. DeMint had four hundred forty-one and 47/100 grams ofmethamphetamine in his car when 
arrested. Tr. p. 25, LL. 14-19, Ex. 1. The street value of this amount ofmethamphetamine is 
between $8,000 and $12,000. Tr. p. 61, LL. 11-19. 
9 A trafficking conviction requires that a defendant possess at least twenty-eight (28) grams of 
methamphetamine. LC. § 37-2732B. Mandatory minimum sentences for trafficking 
methamphetamine are categorized by the amount of methamphetamine a defendant possesses. 
Id. Possession of four hundred or more grams is the highest mandatory sentence category. Id. 
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source of income. Mr. DeMint's bank records, which were admitted during trial, also support 
that Mr. DeMint's funds were derived from drug sales. Despite being unemployed, Mr. DeMint 
made four large deposits in the two months preceding his arrest: $26,268.19 on July 16, 2014, 
$4,650.00 on August 13, 2014, and $5,450.00 and $1,000 on August 18, 2014. Ex. 4, pp. 83, 95. 
These four large deposits equal $37,368.19. Additionally, it is important to note that each of Mr. 
DeMint's large deposits occurred shortly after a series of out-of-state purchases in Yuba City, 
California, Winnemucca, Nevada, and Ogden, Utah, suggesting that Mr. DeMint sold or 
purchased methamphetamine during his travels, and was therefore able to deposit large amounts 
of cash afterward. 4, pp. 83-85, 94-95. Mr. DeMint's bank records also show that he took at 
least six separate trips to California, Utah, and Nevada10 between July 7 and August 20, 2014 
(the date of his arrest). Mr. DeMint's frequency of travel alone is incongruous with the way most 
people travel. Additionally, as aforementioned, Mr. DeMint was in possession of $12,794.00 at 
the time of his arrest, which money has since been forfeited. Mr. DeMint was a drug dealer 
without a legitimate source of income who received large amounts of money for selling 
methamphetamine - the $9,415.64 in his bank account consisted of drug money. 
At the time of his arrest, Mr. DeMint was in possession of four hundred forty-one and 4 7 /100 
grams. Tr. p. 25, LL. 14-19, Ex. 1. Thus he was subject to the highest mandatory sentence per 
Idaho law. 
10 Specifically, the bank records show out-of-state purchases in Utah and Colorado on July 7, 
2014; in Yuba City, California and Winnemucca, Nevada July 21 through July 22, 2014, July 
30 to August 1, 2014, August 7 through August 11, 2014, and August 13 through 14, 2014; and 
in Ogden, Utah on August 20, 2014. Ex. 4, pp. 80-81, 84-85, & 94-95. 
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his account to to 
and sell methamphetamine. His bank records show him making frequent out-of-state purchases 
in Utah, California, and Nevada, many of which were incurred for gas and hotels. Ex. 4, pp. 
83-85, 94-95. At the time of his arrest, Mr. DeMint was traveling in a corridor that is known for 
drug trafficking and he was in possession of a large amount of cash and methamphetamine. Tr. p. 
51, LL. 5-15, p. 52, LL. 3-8. Detective Roberson had information that Mr. DeMint met with his 
source of methamphetamine supply in Ogden, Utah on August, 20, 2014, the date of his arrest in 
Boise. Tr. p. 56, LL. 1-3. Mr. DeMint's bank records support this information Mr. DeMint 
purchased gasoline in Utah on the date he was arrested in Boise. Ex. 4, p. 95. Thus, his bank 
records show him extracting money to purchase the gas that fueled his car in transporting nearly 
a pound of methamphetamine from Ogden to Boise. 
Once in the Ada County Jail, Mr. DeMint asked two individuals outside of the jail to 
withdraw Defendant Property from his bank account. He instructed one man that half of the 
money should be put on his "books" and the other half given to "Linda." Ex. 3, p. 16, LL. 6-11. 
Mr. DeMint explained that he needed the money removed from his account and told the man, 
"Just get it out of the bank for now [ ... ] We'll worry about where it goes. [ ... ] [T]ransfer them 
into someone else's bank account. .. or they're going to confiscate it[.]" Ex. 3, p. 18, LL. 1-8. 
Mr. DeMint feared that Defendant Property would be seized because it was derived from his 
trafficking methamphetamine. 
evidence at hand that ~"~"=" Property is derived from drug sales and that 
it was use 
amount account 
methamphetamine, and his records show purchases to fund his trafficking excursions. The 
money in Mr. DeMint's bank account was used and intended for use in connection with his 




For the reasons set forth above, a directed verdict (or an involuntary dismissal) should not 
have been granted in this matter. Thus, the Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to reverse the 
District Court's decision and remand to allow for a trial under the proper standard. 
DATED this 28th day of June, 2016. 
JAN M. BENNETTS 
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